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In a number of papers, most notably in 'The inverted spectrum', Prof. Sydney 
Shoemaker has argued for what might be called a partially reconciliationist 
position between functionalists and anti-functionalists with regard to the 
nature of certain states of experience, typified by sensory experiences of 
color, sound, and the like, as well as by pain. The functionalist holds that 
such a state, like all psychological states, is defined by its causal role, vis-gt-vis 
'inputs' and 'outputs' and other states of the person or system) The anti- 
functionalist in question here, although perhaps accepting the functionalist 
view of 'intensional' states like belief, denies that an adequate functionalist 
definition can be given to the aforementioned kinds of  states of experience. 
Let us call this sort of anti-functionalist, 'the partisan of inner experience', 
or sometimes just, 'the partisan'. 
'Partisans of inner experience' sometimes invoke, in their attacks on func- 
tionalism, the possibility of cases like that of the 'inverted spectrum', or the 
IS. Functionalism is usually construed as the view that (in the words of Block 
and Fodor) "the type-identity conditions of psychological states refer only to 
their relations to inputs, outputs, and one another". Shoemaker puts it the 
same way, except for the addition of the word "causal" before the word 
"relations". 2 Accordingly, the partisan maintains against this, for example, 
that no matter how exhaustive my knowledge might be of  the causal rela- 
tions of the psychological states to the circumstances and behavior of another, 
and no matter how strong are the grounds therein for thinking that the 
person would behave exactly as I do under the same circumstances (partic- 
ularly those affecting the sensory organs), it may still be that the person's 
color spectrum is inverted with respect to mine, in this way: whereas I use a 
co/or-word, W, to report having a given color-experience, C, he uses W to 
report having, not C, but a different color-experience, C', where C and C' are 
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related by some such one-to-one mapping as the inversion of a color spec- 
trum. 3 If  we regard the color-experience and the relations among them as 
invoked as part of  an explanation of people's behavior, and its relation to 
their circumstances, then the case of the IS will seem just a special case of the 
general phenomenon of the underdetermination of theory by evidence, for 
which there are well-known independent arguments. But apart from these 
arguments, the IS seems to provide a particularly compelling illsutration, 
readily understandable without awareness of the general phenomenon. 4 
According to the partisan, the homely example of the IS lets us see vividly 
that functional role is insufficient to determine experiential state uniquely. 
Let us now consider Shoemaker's treatment of the issue. First of all, he 
rightly emphasizes that there is a difference between intersubjective and 
intrasubjective versions of  the IS, especially because it is more controversial 
that the notion of 'same (color) experience' is a well defined notion for the 
intersubjective case than that it is for the case where the experiences are 
experiences of the same person. Accordingly, he divides the question and 
treats the intrasubjective case first, and then tries thereby to clarify the inter- 
subjective case. Since I think that difficulties arise in his treatment of the 
intrasubjective case, I shall not deal here at all with his account of the inter- 
subjective case, though it is of  considerable interest in its own right, s His 
argument concerning the intrasubjective case is briefly as follows. First, he 
argues that cases of  the IS type can intelligibly be said to occur. He here 
agrees with the partisan against some functionalists, who believe that IS cases 
can be shown to be incoherent. He then grants that there are ascribable to our 
experience certain 'qualities' or 'qualia' that are in a sense independent of 
causal role and indefinable in terms of it. But at the same time he wants to 
maintain that some very important things about these 'qualia' are functionally 
definable, namely, what he calls "similarity and identity conditions" of a 
certain sort. 6 In addition, he maintains that the general property of "having 
qualitative character" is likewise functionally definable. 7 So the upshot (so far 
as the intrasubjective case is concerned) is that he grants something to the 
functionalist and something to the anti-functionalist partisan of inner 
experience: to the latter, certain functionally indefinable 'qualia' of experi- 
ence; to the former, functionally definable "similarity and identity condi- 
tions" and the property of  "having qualitative character". Shoemaker believes 
that this is a satisfying intermediate position. 
Unfortunately, it seems to me that the position turns out not really to 
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be an intermediate one, but leaves out precisely what the partisan of  inner 
experience believes in. The difficulty is that the "identity and similarity con- 
ditions" that Shoemaker holds to be functionally definable go much less far 
than one might hope toward providing functional explanations of  states of  
experience as conceived by the partisan. I shall set this difficulty forth in Part 
II. My other point, to be explained in Part III, is not so much a difficulty in 
Shoemaker's position as it is a problem about the notion o f  a psychological 
state's "having qualitative character", which Shoemaker holds, as we just 
saw, to be functionally definable. 
The difficulty that I wish to point out in Shoemaker's view can best be intro- 
duced by focusing on the use, in discussions of  experience, of  the term 'quale', 
which tends wrongly to suggest that the aspects of  experience that might be 
peculiarly 'inner' are never relations, but are always properties expressible (if 
at all) by one-place predicates. Philosophers talking of  'qualia' usually think 
of  features like greenness, which can be thought of  as introspectible and as 
attaching to a single experience, or pain, which, though seemingly a more 
complicated feature than greenness, also tends to be thought of  as a property 
attaching to single experiences. No doubt the terms 'quale' and 'quality', 
traditionally contrasted in logic with 'relation', were chosen with this idea in 
mind, though it is difficult to know whether the choice of  term was influenc- 
ed by the idea or vice versa (I suspect that it was a bit of  both). 8 But in spite 
of  the prevalence of  this idea, it seems clear on reflection that the features o f  
experience that can be introspectively apprehended, or that are describable as 
'experienced' or 'inner', include relations just as surely as they include 
monadic properties. Within one's visual field at a single moment,  for example, 
one can distinguish some parts as darker green and others as lighter green, and 
there seems no reason to take these relations of  darkerness and lighterness as 
being on a different footing from the property o f  greenness, as far as being an 
inner or experienced feature of  experience is concerned. 9 I am not saying 
that the idea of  'inner' experience is clear or unproblematic. I do not even 
think that it is plain how we tell, or can be confident, that a certain feature is 
'inner' or not. But to whatever degree we are entitled to be confident that 
there are monadic experienced features like greenness, and the other typical 
examples o f  "qualia" in the philosophical literature, I think we are equally 
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entitled to be confident that there are also experienced relational features, 
such as darkerness of a particular color (related to the idea of saturation), or 
(so to speak) the rougherness or smootherness that we experience between 
parts of a single tactile experience, and other relations of this kind. 
To say this is not to settle, nor shall I attempt to settle, how large the class 
of such relations may be, how high the orders of such relations may run (ex- 
perienced relations among experienced properties and relations, and so on), or 
how many relata they may have (howmanyadic they are). It may be, for 
example, that we do not have the capacity to experience relations beyond the 
triadic or tetradic, say, though probably people differ in this regard. Accom- 
plished musicians, for instance, can probably experience many-place relations 
involving tone and timbre, but plainly we can all detect at least two-place 
relations in experience, such as the ones mentioned. I shall also avoid the 
question whether the point I am making in any way conflicts with the idea 
that there are in any sense 'atoms' of  experience. Obviously it all depends on 
what you mean by 'atom' here, and whether - a point often left unclear - 
you think that atomism of this sort requires that the basic features of 
experience must all be monadic and that all the relations among experiences, 
even those among simultaneous parts of a single experiential 'field', must in 
some sense arise from the monadic properties of the atoms. If the point I am 
making conflicts with such a view, then it seems to me that we have powerful 
reason against adopting that view. At any rate, I am simply maintaining, as I 
have said, that our confidence in the existence of at least two-place experienced 
relations deserves, on the basis of straightforward introspection, to be neither 
more nor less great than our confidence in the existence of monadic expe- 
rienced properties. 
For this reason it seems plain that philosophers would do well to dis- 
continue the misleading use of the term 'quale', with its suggestion of a 
restriction to non-relational characteristics of experiences, in discussing the 
present issues. Accordingly in what follows I shall use the phrase 'experienced 
feature' instead, to cover both non-relational and relational experienced 
characteristics of experiences, except where unambiguous reference to Shoe- 
maker's account of his views requires the term 'quale'. 
Though Shoemaker himself does not intend to restrict the notion of a 
quale to non-relational features of experience, I feel sure that the general 
neglect of the incorrectness of such a restriction makes it harder for 
philosophers to notice what I shall now argue is a mistake in Shoemaker's 
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claim of the functional definability of 'similarity and identity conditions' 
of 'qualia'. Since Shoemaker explains identity conditions in terms of similarity 
conditions, we can ignore the former and take up the latter. '~ His way of 
reaching his conclusion, that similarity conditions of 'qualia' are functionally 
definable, is first to accept the view that similarity between two of a single 
person's experiences is behaviorally detectable, and then to infer that if this 
is so, there is no reason to deny that it is "behaviorally definable" as well) 
NOW my first point is that even if we accept that this argument shows the 
functional definability of a certain kind of similarity between one experience 
and another, Shoemaker in the end gives us no reason to think that this 
similarity is the sort of experienced relation whose existence I have just 
pointed out, rather than a kind of functionalist doppelg~nger of an expe- 
rienced relation of similarity, and standing to it as a functionally definable 
monadic feature of experience stands to the monadic 'quale' that it is an 
attempt (unsuccessful, as Shoemaker recognizes, 12 to catch). My second point 
is that if Shoemaker's argument shows the functional definability only of 
such a functionalist doppelg/inger, and not of  a relation of similarity that is 
itself part of 'inner' experience, then Shoemaker's purposes in advancing that 
argument are seriously undermined. 
The first point can be seen as follows, When the partisan of inner expe- 
rience advances the IS as an illustration of his point against the functionalist, 
he holds that even if it is possible to define, in terms of behavior and other 
aspects of causal role, some state of perceiving green, for example, it is still 
possible that that state might be different in the experience of different 
people. But what can be said here about a monadic property like greenness 
can, as we have seen, equally be said about relational attributes. For example, 
the fact that Titian and Tintoretto both use the word 'darker' in the same 
way under the same circumstances, corresponding to a state identically 
specifiable in terms of its causal role, can equally well be held by the partisan 
to fail to show that the 'inner' experience of the relation of darkerness is the 
sameJ a And what holds for this intersubjective case holds equally for intra- 
subjective cases. Nothing rules out shifts of  relational features of experience 
parallel to the diachronic inversions of  the spectrum within a single person, 
for the intelligibility of which Shoemaker argues. The next step is to say that 
if the point holds for relational features of experience in general, there is 
nothing against its holding for similarity. Although the notion of similarity is 
notoriously problematical, the partisan holds, nevertheless the experienced 
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similarity of one part of my present visual field to another seems, so far as 
anything that Shoemaker has said can show, to be no more fixed by the func- 
tional definition that he suggests than is the experienced greenness of one 
part of my visual field by the sort of  functional definition that he rightly 
(from the partisan's point of view) rejects as inadequate. 
This last step, though correct, is nevertheless more complicated than it 
first appears. For although it may seem clear that in principle experienced 
similarity must be underdetermined by functional role as much as any other 
experienced feature is, nevertheless I have given no compelling illustration, 
comparable to illustration provided by the IS in the case of experiences of 
color, to help show the underdetermination. After all, one might ask, what 
relation can one imagine similarity switching with, as one can imagine green 
switching with some other color in the IS? 
To see why this response to the partisan's argument does not succeed, it 
is necessary to look a little more closely at the notion of similarity. It is a 
commonplace (quite apart from Goodman's problem about "grue" and the 
like) that similarity is not a single relation, becauuse - to put it colloquially 
- similarity comes in different 'respects'. 14 Without further explanation, 
therefore, there is no clear sense in asking what relation experienced 
similarity might switch with in the way experienced green might switch with 
some other monadic experienced feature. On the other hand, given an intu- 
itive notion of different 'respects' in which similarity may hold, i.e., of (so to 
speak) different similarity relations, there is relatively clear sense in asking 
whether similarity in one respect might switch with similarity in another. 
But the answer to this question seems evidently affirmative. Once the general 
possibility of switches in experienced features is granted, there seems to be no 
reason why there could not be a switch in color-experience between, for 
example, similarity in hue and similarity in saturation. Such switches are less 
tidy to describe than the IS, because the color spectrum seems to be an 
especially (though not completely) self-contained manifold within experience 
(cf. n. 13). But no one who accepts the possibility of the IS seems prepared 
to assert that less tidy cases, like a switch among different pain-experiences or 
between certain pains and certain tickles, could not possibly arise. So the lack 
of tidiness cannot be reason for denying that such switches of  similarity- 
relations are possible. But if such switches are possible, then we have all that 
we could require by way of a switch of experienced similarity with some 
other experienced relation, there being no other way of construing a 'single' 
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relation of similarity. Indeed, we can even conceive in principle of what we 
could describe as a simultaneous switch of many different similarity-relations, 
i.e., similarities in different 'respects', though of course the details would be 
enormously complicated (even on a naive view of  what 'respects' there are). 
The complication rules out literal imagination of it, for purely contingent 
psychological reasons, but it does not affect the issue. The answer, then, to 
the question what relation experienced similarity might switch with is simply 
that, similarity being what it is, the switch has to be thought of as involving 
similarity in respects, more or fewer of them at a time. 
Once this point is clear, we can for the remainder of the discussion go back 
to our. loose talk of similarity sirnpliciter. If we do, the point that I am urging 
against Shoemaker can be put by calling attention to an ambiguity in the 
phrase "qualitative similarity", which Shoemaker often uses in discussions of 
'qualia'. The phrase can mean simply, 'similarity holding between qualia'. 
This is what Shoemaker's functional definitions might be adequate to 
capture, since they might define a kind of similarity of causal role holding 
between the sorts of states that he calls 'qualia'. But the phrase can also mean 
'similarity between experiences (or parts thereo 0 that is experienced as 
similarity'. This is not captured by Shoemaker's functional account, or at 
least it is no better captured than 'experienced greenness' is by the functional 
account that he rejects. If we use "qualitative similarity" in the former way, 
as simply 'similarity holding between qualia', then we have to recognize 'func- 
tional qualitative similarity' and also 'qualitative qualitative similarity', of 
which Shoemaker deals only with the former. As I have said, however, it 
would be better to describe the latter as 'experienced similarity among experi- 
ences'. 
My second point is simply that Shoemaker's reconciliationist purposes are 
underminded by the first point. If there are experienced relations, including 
similarity, as well as experienced monadic properties, there is considerably 
more that is not caught by functional definitions than there appeared to be, 
and Shoemaker is further away than he appeared to be from showing the 
accessibility of the 'inner' to functionalist explanation. While he agrees with 
the partisan that 'individual qualia' are not themselves definable in func- 
tionalist terms (cf. refs. in Note 12), his contention that their "similarity and 
identity conditions" are functionally definable seemed intended to suggest 
that functional accounts can say all there is to say about similarity and identity 
of qualia. But it turns out that on Shoemaker's showing, functionalist 
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accounts can say about these conditions only what there is to say, so to 
speak, from the functionalist point of view, not what there is to say about 
similarity and identity of experiences from the viewpoint of the partisan. The 
partisan recognizes experienced similarity, which is untreated by Shoemaker's 
functionalist account. And just as Shoemaker defines a functionalist notion 
of identity of 'quale', on the basis of the idea that similar experiences share 
an identical 'quale', so too the partisan may wish to try to define a parallel 
notion of the identity of a feature of experience, but using the notion of 
experienced similarity rather than Shoemaker's functionalist substitute. Thus 
it appears that we are as far away as ever from the goal of explicating the 
identity of features of experience in functionalist terms. One's response to 
this may be, 'So much the worse for the partisan's view'. And Shoemaker's 
response might be that he was after all trying to reconcile with functionalism 
a belief in 'inner' experience much less extreme than that of the partisan 
whom I have portrayed. Still, I think that my partisan accurately reflects the 
views of many who have believed in 'inner' experience, and that examining 
his views helps us see more clearly what the functionalist must either cope 
with or dismiss as not worth trying to cope with. 
I I I  
Another part of Shoemaker's reconciliationist efforts is interesting to com- 
pare with what we have just seen, because it enables us to realize further just 
how inaccessible to functional explanation 'inner' experience can be held to 
be, at least by a partisan of inner experience who is willing to carry out his 
view consistently. In other papers, Shoemaker takes up what has come to be 
known as the problem of 'absent qualia', is The problem, as directed against a 
functionalist account of experience, is supposed to be that if experiential 
states consisted simply in their roles in a causal network, then it would be 
possible for a person or being to exist in whom the same behavior was pro- 
duced by a causal mechanism with the same structure as in a normal human 
being, but in whom the states responsible for the behavior lacked all 'qualita- 
tive character'. Shoemaker argues in this paper that such a case is not 
possible, by arguing that if a state is functionally identical with a state having 
qualitative character, then it must itself have qualitative character. His argu- 
ment is that if this were not so, then qualitative character would be 'irrelevant' 
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to all knowledge of minds, even to introspective knowledge of one's own 
state of mind. 16 For he holds that we must say that a state's having qualita- 
tive character must cause the belief that one is in a state having qualitative 
character, and if this belief has behavioral effects, then the qualitative charac- 
ter of  that state clearly has a role in a causal network including some 
behavioral output, and this (Shoemaker supposes) will be enough to yield a 
functional account of the state. 
Aside from the fact that this argument, like others among Shoemaker's 
arguments, relies on a so-called "causal theory of knowledge", 17 we should 
notice that it could be taken in two ways, of which the latter is the important 
one for our present purposes. On the one hand, it could be taken to hold that 
a state's having a particular qualitative character must be causally responsible 
for one's belief that it has that particular character, in which case it would 
purport to argue for the possibility of functional accounts of particular 
qualia. But since this is not what Shoemaker has in mind at this point, and is 
clearly repudiated by him, I shall pass over it here. 18 Here he means that a 
state's having some qualitative character or other must be causally responsible 
for one's belief that it has some qualitative character or other. In this case, 
the argument is defending the possibility of  a functional account of the 
property of  having qualitative character. 
Presented with Shoemaker's belief in the possibility of a functional 
account of the property of 'having qualitative character', it is natural to want 
to know more about the property of which the account is being offered. It is 
especially interesting to ask whether it is a property that one might take to be 
what I have in Part II called an experienced property of experience. I f  it were, 
then of course by defining it functionally we would gain something that has 
so far eluded us, namely, a functional account of  a genuinely 'inner' feature 
of  experience. Now although some of Shoemaker's remarks might be taken to 
suggest that he thinks of 'having qualitative character' as itself a 'qualitative' 
or experienced character, he never says that it is so. Others, however, seem to 
have taken such a view. For instance, in reading Thomas Nagel's paper, 'What 
is it like to be a bat?' one has the strong impression that things like 'having 
qualitative character', or 'being a conscious experience', or the like, are being 
treated as being a single property of experience, which property is itself a 
'qualitative' or experienced property. 19 Parallel, then, to the attempted 
subjection of my experienced greenness to some functional account, we 
might think (even if Shoemaker does not) that Shoemaker provides an 
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at tempted subjection of  my  experienced experiencedness to another, more 
general, functional account. 2~ 
Although I do not propose here to enter deeply into the horrendously dif- 
ficult problems about consciousness and self-consciousness that this idea 
raises, I want to suggest that it is wrong, on one of  two counts. First, I think 
that it is highly doubtful  that there is an experienced feature of  experience, 
that of  being experienced, or in other words, a feature of  having 'qualitative' 
character that is' itself a 'quale' ,  and so I do not think that a functional 
account of  having 'qualitative' character is itself a functional account of  
something ' inner' ,  on a par with a functional account of  something like the 
' inner'  greenness of  an experience. Second, if there were, or should turn out 
to be, such an experienced feature, I see no reason why a functionalist 
account of  it should not fall prey to just the same difficulty that I pointed 
out earlier, namely, that the functionalist account does not catch the ' inner'  
feature that  the partisan wants, but only a functionalist doppelggnger thereof. 
In arguing that being experienced is not an experienced feature of  expe- 
riences, it is a little difficult to know what one has to go on beyond introspec- 
tion. Perhaps all that I can give is an analogue to Hume's  claim that when he 
looked for his self he could not find it, and say that when I consider my  
experiences, I do not  find an experienced feature of  being experienced that 
attaches to them all, or indeed any experienced feature, qualitative or rela- 
tional, that  attaches to them all. Nor have I ever heard a description by any- 
one else of  such a feature that strikes me as at all apt, as - for whatever this 
fact is worth - I have heard descriptions by others of  other experiences of  
mine that have struck me as apt. It might be suggested, for example, that the 
feature in question is simply what visual, auditory, and other sensory expe- 
riences, along with non-sensory experiences like pains, tickles, etc., 'have in 
common' .  But m y  response is that  although I can certainly make some sort of  
sense of  this use of  the 'has-in-common' abstraction operator, it does not 
yield, in m y  mind, anything that I could describe as an experienced feature. 
Rightly or wrongly, i doubt that such a feature exists. This is not to deny 
that the notion of  being an experience, the notion of being a conscious expe- 
rience, or the notion of  having experienced or 'qualitative' character, is a 
good or clear notion. Nor is it to assert that such a notion must be a ' theoret- 
ical' notion, in the sense of  being derived from efforts to theorize about the 
external world or one's  empirical observation. This might be true, or the 
notion might be developed in some other way. Nevertheless, whatever the 
THE S O - C A L L E D  ' Q U A L I A '  OF E X P E R I E N C E  379 
status of  the notion, it does not seem 
or 'qualitative'  feature. 
To turn to my  second point about 
what I have said, there really is a single 
of  a single person which is the feature 
at tempt to capture this feature ha 
to me to be a notion of  an experienced 
this matter,  suppose that, contrary to 
experienced feature of  the experiences 
of  being experienced, and consider the 
a functionalist account. Shoemaker 's  
account in 'The inverted spectrum' is briefly this: for a state to have 'qualita- 
tive character'  is for it to bear the relation of  'qualitative similarity' (or 
'qualitative difference') to some other state. 21 Now as we have seen in Part II, 
Shoemaker 's  'qualitative similarity' is not the same as the experienced 
similari ty that the partisan believes in. Rather, 'qualitative similarity' is a cer- 
tain very general sort of  similarity of  causal role. It follows that 'having quali- 
tative character' ,  as Shoemaker defines it, is not an experienced feature, but is 
rather a property,  which an experience may have, o f  bearing that very general 
similarity of  causal role to some other thing. 
As I have said, however, this is not to maintain either that Shoemaker tries 
to give a functional account of  an experienced feature but fails, since he does 
not regard 'having qualitative character'  as itself a 'qualitative' or experienced 
feature. As I have also said, it seems to me that he is quite correct here. 
Introspection, at least, seems to indicate that  being experienced is indeed not 
an experienced feature. So it seems possible enough that  it is, even in our 
ordinary way of  thinking of  it, a functional notion. I f  that were so, then 
Shoemaker 's  account of  it, if otherwise satisfactory, could perfectly well be 
a functionalist account of  what was all along a functionalist notion. 
We have also seen, however, that some philosophers appear to think that 
being experienced is an experienced feature. Nagel seems to be among them, 
inasmuch as he holds that " the fact that an organism has conscious experience 
... means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism ... 
- something it is like f o r  the organism". 22 Although Nagel says nothing fully 
explicit on the point, his manner of  writing suggests, I think, that he believes 
that this phrase, "something it is like to be",  points to a single experienced 
something running through, so to speak, all of  the experience that a particular 
organism, or type of  organism, has. As I have said, I think that this is highly 
doubtful. I doubt that my  own experiences share any experienced features 
that could be either (what Nagel concentrates on) "what it is like to be 
human",  or "what it is like to be me" ,  or "what it is like to be conscious (or, 
so to speak, to have some what-it-is-like)". But rather than enter here into a 
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discussion of  Nagel's line of  thought, let me simply point out that, so far as 
I can see, nothing else in his paper depends on holding that there is a such a 
single experienced feature. On his view, there is a sense in which I cannot con- 
ceive what it is like to be a bat, but this need not be because on his view there 
is a single experienced "what it is like" that  a bat has and I cannot have, but 
need only be because a bat 's  experience has certain particular experienced 
features that mine does not have, and that I am unable imaginatively to call 
up because of  my  great dissimilarity to a bat. 23 So what I am denying here is 
simply a suggestion (sometimes a fairly strong one) 24 but not a thesis, of  his 
paper. I think that  this point is revelatory if only in that it shows that  even an 
anti-functionalist as extreme as Nagel is not committed by his very anti- 
functionalism to a belief in the experienced feature that I am calling into 
question. 
What are the consequences of  the claim that  being experienced is itself not 
an experienced feature of  experience? (1) For one thing, it would be especial- 
ly interesting to discuss its consequences for the so-called 'absent qualia 
argument ' ,  or AQA, but doing that  would require a full-scale treatment of  
that argument, which is not possible here. I shall limit myself  to the following 
observation. To most people, the consequence that the AQA tries to draw 
from functionalism - viz., that on functionalism a person might be adequate- 
ly described by the same psychological theory as anyone else but still have no 
'qualitative states' - seems bizarre. Indeed, part of  the whole problem of  
understanding our psychology is to understand why it seems so bizarre. 
Clearly, one element of  its bizarreness is one's sense that it is just obvious in 
some strange way that  one does have experiences, with experienced features. 
I f  what I have said is right, then although it comes nowhere near solving the 
whole problem, it at least shows that  that sense of  obviousness does not arise 
from the fact that  being experienced is a feature that one experiences one's 
experiences to have. (2) A second consequence of the claim bears on Shoe- 
maker 's  contention, which I have not had space to treat (cf. nn. 1 and 16), a 
estate's having 'qualitative character'  is part o f  what causes in one the belief 
that it has 'qualitative character'.  As I have said, Shoemaker rests this claim 
on a quite general form of  the "causal theory of  knowledge" (cf. n. 17), and 
does not go into how this causation works. Nor shall I do so here. But at least 
we can see that if one's belief that  one's states have experienced features is 
caused in part by their having them, it is not caused by one's experiencing 
that that is so. 
THE SO-CALLED ' Q U A L I A '  OF EXPERIENCE 381 
My main  po in t  t h r o u g h o u t  this paper ,  however ,  has been  to  show some- 
thing abou t  a substant ia l  and inf luent ia l  n o t i o n  o f  ' inner '  exper ience ,  and 
someth ing  abou t  wha t  in tha t  no t i on  - w h e t h e r  misguided or no t  - makes  it 
so diff icul t  for  funct ional i s t  accoun t s  to  catch.  2s 
NOTES 
Sydney Shoemaker, 'The inverted spectrum', Journal o f  Philosophy 79 (1982), pp. 
357-381. See also Shoemaker, 'Functionalism and qualia', Philosophical Studies 27 
(1975), pp. 291-315; and 'Absent qualia are impossible - a reply to Block', Philosoph- 
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else one will be unable ever to know of one's own experiences that they are 'phenom- 
enally similar' to each other. If successful, this argument would refute what I claim in 
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See N. J. Block and J. A. Fodor, 'What psychological states are not', Philosophical 
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whether the addition of the word 'causal' makes a difference to the points at issue, but I 
shall here assume that it does not. 
It should be noted that although Block and Fodor advance the IS against functionalism, 
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used in this paper. 
3 The formulation given, though typical, is loose. For example, the phrase, 'used to 
report', is problematical in various respects. So is the specification of the kind of map- 
ping, partly for reasons given by Shoemaker. 
4 It is obviously an important problem how we can claim to tell, independently of 
general arguments about the underdetermination of theory by evidence (here, under- 
determination of theory involving ascription of experiences by evidence of behavior and 
circumstances and perhaps other features of structure), that the IS is an illustration of 
the phenomenon. The partisan will of course hold that introspection is crucially involved 
in so doing, and then the question arises what introspection is. 
s See 'The inverted spectrum', pp. 372-381. The pages prior to p. 372 also bear 
importantly on intersubjective cases, but I shall in general try to confine myself to issues 
affecting the intrasubjective cases primarily. 
6 See ibid., pp. 370-371 (cf. pp. 372-373), and 'Functionalism and qualia', pp. 301, 
306. 
See 'The inverted spectrum', p. 371, and 'Functionalism and Qualia', pp. 293-297. 
s In Mind and the World Order (New York, 1929), C. I. Lewis uses the term 'quale' in 
such a way that it seems confined to non-relations, as on pp. 60-66,  124, but on pp. 
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125-126 it looks as though he is allowing a relational 'quale' involved in what he calls 
'immediate comparison', though he does not develop the idea. Schlick shows a similar 
vacillation in 'Positivism and realism,' originally published in Erkenntnis III (1932-3), 
and cited here from A. J. Ayer, ed., LogiealPositivism (Glencoe, 1959), pp. 82-107. On 
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are experienced (pp. 93-95),  without, however, exploring the matter. In The Structure 
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10 See 'The inverted spectrum', p. 370, and 'Functionalism and qualia', pp. 301, 306. 
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argument; cf. 'Absent qualia are impossible', pp. 582 ff. 
12 'The inverted spectrum', pp. 364-365 ,371-372;  cf. also 'Functionalism and qualia', 
pp. 308-309, where Shoemaker denies that 'qualitative beliefs', i.e., beliefs that one is 
in a particular qualitative state, are functionally.defmable. (Notice that although I use 
the convenient word 'doppelg~nger', the point is emphatically not that there is one-to-one 
correlation of functional relation and experienced relation. Rather, the point is that 
there may be a plurality of experienced relations corresponding to a single functional 
one.) 
13 Conceivably, for example, we might have inversions of darkerness and lighterness, a 
bit like inversions of the spectrum. Notice, for example, that the point does not depend 
on holding that it is easy to 'visualize' or otherwise 'imagine' a particular inversion or 
alteration. 
14 See Goodman, op. r passim, esp. pp. 145-149, 169-187,267ff. ;  and also 'Seven 
strictures on similarity', L. Foster and J.W. Swanson, ed., Experience and Theory 
(Amherst, 1970), pp. 19-29, reprinted in Goodman, Problems and Projeets (Indianapolis 
and New York, 1972), pp. 437-446, esp., in the latter pagination, pp. 4 4 1 - 4 4 3 , 4 4 4 -  
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'Phenomenal similarity'. 
is See the citations in note 1. 
14 'Functionalism and qualia', pp. 293,294ff., 296-297. 
17 Ibid., pp. 297-298; ef. 'Phenomenal similarity', pp. 19-20, 22-25.  
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19 Thomas Nagel, 'What is it like to be a bat', PhilosophicalReview 83 (1974), reprinted 
in Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge, England, 1979), pp. 165-180. I shall cite from 
the latter version. 
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that 'having qualitative character' is itself an experienced feature, and this can be seen 
from 'Functionalism and qualia', pp. 306,309. 
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